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I. THE LAW OF FREE EXPRESSION
Freedom of expression is of fundamental importance in a democracy. This truism 
commands almost universal assent in the abstract, and was confirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Committee For Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada1 when 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. approved the following passage of Cory JA . in R. v. Kopyto:
It is difficult to imagine a more important guarantee of freedom to a democratic 
society than that of freedom of expression. A democracy cannot exist without the 
freedom to express new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning 
of public institutions. These opinions may be critical of existing practices in public 
institutions and of the institutions themselves. However, change for the better is dependent upon constructive criticism. Nor can it be expected that criticism will 
always be muted by restraint. Frustration with outmoded practices will often lead 
to vigorous and unpropitious complaints. Hyperbole and colourful, perhaps even 
disrespectful language, may be the necessary touchstone to fire the interest and imagination of the public, to the need for reform, and to suggest the manner in 
which that reform may be achieved.2
L’Heureux-Dubé J. went on to say:
While I may not go as far as MacGuigan J. at the Court of Appeal, who found 
that the lack of internal modifiers renders the s. 2(b) guarantee “absolute”, I do believe that it should be given a large and liberal application. This appears to be 
consistent with the approach embraced by this court in its prior interpretations of 
the provision.3
Given this theoretical position, it may seem surprising that so much of our 
daily political debate and passion is spent on both condemning what someone has 
said and attempting to punish or discipline someone for mere words.4 Yet in a 
period of history in which powerful lobbies compete for more power, influence and 
prestige, it is not surprising that they seize upon expression offensive to their 
members, both as a way of showing their strength and as a device for maintaining
*Of the Faculty of Law, McGill University (Montreal).
*(1991) 120 N.R. 241 at 286 [hereinafter Committee].
2(1987), 47 D.L.R. (4th 213), 24 OAC. 81 at 90-91.
Committee, supra note 1 at 287-88. See also C. Beckton “La Liberté d’Expression” in Beaudoin and
Tomopolsky Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertes (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1989). See also 
Corporation of the City of Peterborough v. Ramsden, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084 [hereinafter Peterborough 
(City)] for another case in which freedom of expression prevailed over the public authority’s property 
rights.
the interest and cohesiveness of their membership. Everyone, it seems, believes 
in the freedom of expression except with respect to their own fundamental beliefs 
or feelings.
Of course, it is clear that freedom of expression is not absolute. There are 
situations in which the evils of the expression will outweigh the principle of 
freedom. There are also other situations in which two different Charte? rights 
may conflict.6
With respect to such conflicts, the Supreme Court has recently refused to rank 
the rights in any hierarchic manner.7 The Court reaffirmed the importance of 
free expression without turning it into a “trump” card prevailing over all other 
rights. It is a difficult freedom to set aside, but not a different category of 
freedom.
The difficulty of justifying s. 1 limitations with respect to freedom of expression 
has been made clear in a number of judgments, although this has hardly 
dampened the enthusiasm of would-be limitators who attempt to rationalize them.
In R. v. Zundel (No. 2), McLachlin J. said :
This Court has repeatedly affirmed that all communications which convey or 
attempt to convey meaning are protected by s. 2(b), unless the physical form by 
which the communication is made (for example, by a violent act) excludes 
protection: Irwin Toy, supra, at p. 970, per Dickson, C J., and Lamer and Wilson,
JJ. In determining whether a communication falls under s. 2(b), this court has 
consistently refused to take into account the content of the communication, adhering to the precept that it is often the unpopular statement which is most in 
need of protection under the guarantee of free speech: see, e.g., Keegstra, supra, 
at p. 828, per McLachlin, J.; R  v. Butler and McCord, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; 134 
N.R. 81; 778 Man. R. (2d) 1; 16 WA.C. 1, at p. 488, per Sopinka, J.8
5Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.ll.
'’See AA . Borovoy, When Freedoms Collide (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1990).
1Dagenais et al. v. CBC et al. (8 December 1994), No. 23403 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Dagenais],
8(1992), 140 N.R. 1 at 18-19 (S.CC) [hereinafter Zundel (No. 2)]. See also Osborne v. The Queen 
(1991), 82 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.CC.) [hereinafter Osborne]; Libman v.A.G. Que., [1992] RJ.Q. 2141 
(Que. S.C.).
This refusal to exclude any form of non-violent expression from protection has 
made it substantially harder to justify any form of repression, if only because the 
burden is automatically placed on those seeking to restrict.9
In a series of judgments it was made clear that all expressions were not equally 
protected and, in particular, commercial expression was somewhat less so.10 Yet 
in many of the “commercial” cases, freedom prevailed over well-intentioned but 
excessive attempts at control.11
A case of particular interest for university freedom of expression, although not 
a university case, is Cabaret Sex Appeal v. City of Montreal}2 Owners of nude 
dancing cabarets succeeded in setting aside a Montreal by-law which prohibited 
any use of the human body in outside billboards and advertisements.13 Baudouin 
JA . took dead aim at “political correctness” and pointed out, as had McLachlin 
J.,14 that it is precisely the unpopular, controversial and even hurtful expression 
that needs protection, not the safe and bland kind:
Une société libre et démocratique comme la nôtre doit nécessairement faire 
preuve d’un haut degré de tolérance pour l’expression de pensées, d’opinions, d’attitudes ou d’actions qui non seulement ne font pas l’unanimité ou ne rallient 
pas les vues de la majorité des citoyens, mais encore peuvent être dérangeantes, 
choquantes ou même blessantes pour certaines personnes ou pour certains 
groupes. La liberté d’expression ne doit pas être couchée dans le lit de Procuste 
du political correctness. Ce n’est que dans l’hypothèse d’abus clairs, et donc de 
danger pour le caractère libre et démocratique de la société, qu’au nom de la 
protection de certaines valeurs fondamentales, alors non négociables, on peut 
imposer l’intervention légitime de la loi.15
*The test otR  v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 applies, tempered by the rule of generous and purposive 
Charter interpretation spelled out in Gamble v. The Queen, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595. See also Edwards 
Books v. The Queen, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 and Quebec Association of Protestant School Board et al v. 
A.G. Que, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66.
l0Ford v. A.G. Que, [1988] 2 S.GR. 712 [hereinafter Ford]; Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons 
of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.GR. 232 [hereinafter Rocket]; Irwin Toy Ltd. v.A.G. Que, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
[hereinafter Irwin Toy\, Maroist v. Barreau du Québec [1987] RJ.Q. 2322 (Que. GA.) [hereinafter 
Maroist]; Prostitution Reference, [1990] 1 S.GR. 1123.
uFord, ibid.; Rocket, ibid.; Maroist, ibid.; Bernstein c. Tribunal des Professions [1993] RJ.Q. 1487.
12[1992] RJ.Q. 2189 (Que. S.G), Piché J., affd [1994] RJ.Q. 2133 (Que. CA.) [hereinafter Cabaret 
Sex Appeal].
13The motivation was the theory that such advertising demeaned women in society and the expertise 
filed by the City had a “feminist” ring reminiscent of many university debates.
14See Zundel (No. 2), supra note 8 at 17.
He continued on the same page:
La loi ne doit pas, au nom du simple droit de n’être pas dérangé, choqué, voire 
même insulté dans ses opinions, censurer une conduite simplement parce qu’elle 
ne rencontre pas l’approbation ou les vues de certaines personnes ou de certains groupes.
It follows that only in exceptional cases will courts permit the restriction of 
freedom of expression. Either the limitation must be relatively minor or 
marginal16 or the harm from the expression must be of a particularly weighty 
nature. A consideration of the leading cases where restrictions were upheld 
illustrates this. In Irwin Toy the Supreme Court noted:
But having identified advertising aimed at persons under 13 as perse manipulative, 
the legislature of Quebec could conclude just as reasonably that the only effective 
statutory response was to ban such advertising.17
In other words, advertising aimed at children was banned because of its inherently 
undesirable nature.18
In R. v. Keegstra,19 the Supreme Court upheld Canada’s legislation outlawing 
hate propaganda.20 However, Dickson C J.C. went on to show just how little 
restriction the law would tolerate:
The meaning of “hatred” remains to be elucidated. Just as “wilfully” must be interpreted in the setting of s. 319(2), so must the word “hatred” be defined 
according to the context in which it is found. A dictionary definition may be of 
limited aid to such an exercise, for by its nature a dictionary seeks to offer a 
panoply of a possible usages, rather than the correct meaning of a word as 
contemplated by Parliament. Noting the purpose of s. 319(2), in my opinion the 
term “hatred” connotes emotion of an intense and extreme nature that is clearly 
associated with vilification and detestation. As Cory JA. stated in R. v. Andrews, supra, at p. 179:
Hatred is not a word of casual connotation. To promote hatred is to 
instil detestation, enmity, ill-will [sic] and malevolence in another. Clearly 
an expression must go a long way before it qualifies within the definition in [s. 319(2)].
16See Prostitution Reference, supra note 10; R  v. Canadian Newspapers Ltd. (1988), 65 C.R. (3d) 50 
(S.C.C) [hereinafter Canadian Newspapers].
17Supra note 10 at 999.
iaThe decision was backed up by an overwhelming statistical and sociological case showing the 
defencelessness of children.
19[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter Keegstra].
a>This writer must say at once that, despite narrowness of the majority ruling, he prefers McLachlin 
J.’s dissent.
Hatred is predicated on destruction, and hatred against identifiable groups 
therefore thrives on insensitivity, bigotry and destruction on both the 
target group and of the values of our society. Hatred in this sense is a 
most extreme emotion that belies reason; an emotion that, if exercised against members of an identifiable group, implies that those individuals 
are to be despised, scorned, denied respect and made subject to ill- 
treatment on the basis of group affiliation.
Those who argue that s. 319(2) should be struck down submit that it is 
impossible to define with care and precision a term like “hatred”. Yet, 
as I have stated, the sense in which “hatred” is used in s. 319(2) does not 
denote a wide range of diverse emotions, but is circumscribed so as to 
cover only the most intense form of dislike.21
He continued:
Recognizing the need of circumscribing the definition of “hatred” in the manner 
referred to above, a judge should direct the jury (or him or herself) regarding the 
nature of the term as it exists in s. 319(2).22
It is evident that even the majority in Keegstra would not have saved the 
provisions against hate propaganda were it not for this very narrow scope. This 
is confirmed by the opposite result in Zundel (No 2),23 where the scope of the 
prohibition was a little broader.
Another case which makes this point is Butler v. The Queen,24 which declared 
the criminalization of pornography to be valid. Sopinka J. said:
In making this determination with respect to the three categories of pornography 
referred to above, the portrayal of sex coupled with violence will almost always constitute the undue exploitation of sex. Explicit sex which is degrading or 
dehumanizing may be undue if the risk or harm is substantial. Finally, explicit sex 
that is not violent and neither degrading nor dehumanizing is generally tolerated 
in our society and will not qualify as the undue exploitation of sex unless it 
employs children in its production.25
If this were not sufficient to make the point, Sopinka J concluded:
On the other hand, the civil liberties groups argue that pornography forces us to 
question conventional notions of sexuality and thereby launches us into an 
inherently political discourse. In their factum, the British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association adopts a passage from R. West, “The Feminist-Conservative Anti-
21See Keegstra, supra note 19 at 777-778.
nIbUL at 778.
nSupra, note 8.
*[1992] 1 S.C.R. 452.
^Ibid. at 485. Gonthier J. was much more restrictive, but he spoke for only two of seven Judges.
Pornography Alliance and the 1986 Attorney General’s Commission on 
Pornography Report” (1987), 4 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 681, at p. 696:
Good pornography has value because it validates women’s will to 
pleasure. It celebrates female nature. It validates a range of female sexuality that is wider and truer than that legitimated by the non- 
pomographic culture. Pornography (when it is good) celebrates both female pleasure and male rationality.
A proper application of the test should not suppress what West refers to as “good 
pornography”. The objective of the impugned provision is not to inhibit the celebration of human sexuality.26
Once again, the law can prohibit only extreme abuse or, as Baudouin JA. said, 
“ce n’est que dans l’hypothèse d’abus clair et donc de danger pour le caractère 
libre et démocratique de la société ...”.27
The third major case which has brought out this point is AG. Canada v. R.J.R. 
MacDonald Inc.28 While some dicta in this case, especially with respect to Irwin 
Toy,29 might make it seem that there has been an evolution favourable to 
governments, the very high onus on any restrictive legislation is shown by the 
following passages from the pen of Justice LeBel:
1. La Loi comme telle vise un problème de santé publique. Ce n’est pas une 
simple loi de réglementation d’un aspect de la publicité.
2. Dans la société moderne, le tabagisme constitue en effet un problème de santé 
majeur. Suivant l'ensemble d’une preuve médicale, que l’on n’a pas contredite, et 
dont des extraits abondants sont cités au mémoire de l’appelant, la consommation 
du tabac crée un environnement qui paraît favoriser l’éclosion d’un certain nombre 
de maladies. Le mémoire de l’appelant cite plusieurs extraits de témoignages ou 
de rapports d’expertises pertinents, à ce sujet. Ainsi, le docteur Beauchamp 
témoignait que la seule façon de prévenir le cancer du poumon est l’arrêt de la consommation de cigarettes (m.a., p. 34; au même sens, voir docteur Lefco, cité 
p. 37). On peut aussi se reporter au long témoignage et aux expertises d’un médecin et spécialiste anglais, fort connu dans le domaine, le docteur Richard 
Doll. Le rapport et le témoignage du docteur Doll concluent à une interaction 
entre la santé et la consommation du tabac et à la nécessité de restreindre celle-ci, pour préserver celle-là autant que possible.
^Ibid. at 500.
^See Cabernet Sex Appeal, supra note 12.
^[1993] RJ.R. 375 (Que. CA.). This case is under reserve having been heard by the Supreme Court
of Canada.
3. La consommation du tabac présenterait un caractère graduellement addictif, 
qui rendrait la cessation de l’habitude difficile, selon plusieurs témoins.30 
[emphasis added]
The inescapable conclusion is that freedom of expression is seen as a 
particularly significant guarantee of freedom and democracy in Canada and it will 
not easily be restrained for some perceived public good.31 Moreover, the mere 
fact that an unquestionably lofty ideal inspired the legislator will not be sufficient. 
If it were, the Osborne case could not have been decided as it was.
In the latest Supreme Court case, Dagenais,32 the court refused to rank the 
various Charter guarantees in order of importance.33 However, the majority 
judgment by Lamer C J.C. reiterated the past dicta about freedom of expression 
and its crucial importance. Further, Lamer C J.C. dealt another blow to those who 
wanted to see in Irwin Toy34 an indication that any reasonable impairment would 
pass the s.l test, rather than as minor an impairment as reasonably possible:
A party who uses the power of the state against others must bear the burden of 
proving that the use of state power is justified in a free and democratic society. 
Therefore, the party seeking the ban bears the burden of proving that the 
proposed ban is necessary, in that it relates to an important objective that cannot 
be achieved by a reasonably available and effective alternative measure, that the 
proposed ban is as limited (in scope, time, content, etc.) as possible, and there is a proportionality between the salutary and deleterious effects of the ban.35
He added:
d) The judge must consider all other options besides the ban and must find that 
there is no reasonable and effective alternative available.
e) The judge must consider all possible ways to limit the ban and must limit the 
ban as much as possible.36
Except in the most unusual cases, freedom of expression must take precedence 
over such factors as personal taste, claims that individuals or groups may be 
offended, and any notions of truth or orthodoxy.
x IbieL at 397-398.
3lOsbome, supra note 8. No one can doubt that the independence of the public service is both a 
proper and significant goal.
32Supra note 7.
- ¾  this, the Court was almost certainly very wise.
MSupra note 10.
^See Dagenais, supra note 7 at 49. See also Peterborough (City), supra note 3.
36Dagenais, ibid. at SO.
II THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES TO THE UNIVERSITY
The university is an institution which by the nature of its endeavour should be both 
particularly sensitive to freedom of expression and vigilant in its defence. 
Dedicated to inquiry and research and devoid of physical or finann>1 means of 
defence against the powerful and the wealthy, the university is constantly 
vulnerable to those who would limit its freedom or hijack its capacities for their 
own purposes. The force of Cory J.’s words in Edmonton Journal v. A.G. 
Alberta37 is much augmented when applied to a university context.
It is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more important to a democratic society 
than freedom of «pression. Indeed a democracy cannot exist without that 
freedom to express new ideas and to put forward opinions about the functioning 
of public institutions. The concept of free and uninhibited speech permeates all truly democratic societies and institutions. The vital importance of the concept 
cannot be over-emphasized. No doubt that was the reason why the framers of the 
Charter set forth s. 2(b) in absolute terms which distinguishes it, for example, from 
s.8 of the Charter which guarantees the qualified right to be secure from 
unreasonable search. It seems that the rights enshrined in s. 2(b) should therefore only be restricted in the clearest of circumstances.
The vital and fundamental importance of freedom of expression has been 
recognized in decisions of this Court. In RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986]
2 S.C.R. 573, McIntyre J., speaking for the majority, put the position in this way at p. 583:
Freedom of expression is not, however, a creature of the Charter. It is 
one of the fundamental concepts that has formed the basis for the historical development of the political, social and educational institutions 
of western society. Representative democracy, as we know it today, which 
is in great part the product of free expression and discussion of vaiying 
ideas, depends upon its maintenance and protection.
The importance of freedom of expression has been recognized since early times: 
see John Milton, Areopagitica; A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicenc’d Printing, to the 
Parliament o f England (1644), and as well John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty” in On 
Liberty and Consideration on Representative Government (Oxford 1946), at p. 14:
If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were 
of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing 
that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 at 1336-37 [hereinafter Edmonton Journal]. It is to be noted that those words 
came only a few months after Irwin Toy, supra, note 10, which is another indication that Irwin Toy did 
not represent a major change of direction.
And, after stating that “All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility, 
he said, at p. 16:
Yet it is evident in itself, as any amount of argument can make it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age having held many 
opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; 
and it is as certain that many opinions now general will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.
Nothing in the vast literature on this subject reduces the importance of Mill’s 
words. The principle of freedom of speech and expression has been firmly 
accepted as a necessary feature of modem democracy.
Yet the university has not always been immune to repressive forces. Medieval 
universities enforced religious orthodoxy, as did both Oxford and Cambridge until 
the 19th century. Not long ago American universities took part in the anti­
communist witch-hunt of Senator McCarthy. German universities “purified” 
themselves of Jews and threw out anti-Nazi scholars and, in the last few years 
Czech universities applied the “lustration” laws to remove former Communists, 
with most of the West watching admiringly. In one sense, this is proof only that 
the university is not sheltered from society. On the other hand, it does serve as 
a warning that its members, like other citizens, can be easily induced into thinking 
that freedom of expression applies only to their views, when they are not the 
dominant view.
Today’s North American universities have fallen prey to a form of “political 
correctness” coming often from those who think of themselves as left of centre. 
This has made the expression of certain views on ethnic, sexual and historical 
issues dangerous, and has also created a hierarchy of hiring and publication 
independent of a person’s expressed views or merit and based instead on his or 
her origin or gender.
The problem must be put into its context. The universities operate in a world 
of few jobs and fierce competition. The left appears to have been largely defeated 
in its quest for social justice and equality in society and its members have been 
forced to compete for the remaining limited research funds that the dominant 
lobbies control. It is not surprising that in such circumstances the atmosphere in 
the university is less than ideal.
“Political correctness” is something that exists in every sphere of activity at all 
times. It can best be described as those prescribed opinions with which it is 
dangerous to differ, not because of physical repression, but because of the effect 
on one’s career.38 The “political correctness” of university feminists or ethnic
3&There is usually a hiring and promotion preferential scheme attached to it.
lobbies is more than matched by the “political correctness” of economic liberalism 
which permeates The Economist or the business pages of most Canadian 
newspapers* This shows that criticism of the university alone is unfair. It 
nevertheless does not excuse the university’s shortcomings.
In a recent book, Professor John Fekete, of Trent University, illustrates and 
documents the extent of the problem in Canada.40 He is interested mostly in the 
feminist side of the problem, but roughly similar difficulties arise from excessive 
influence of ethnic or native lobbies.
Those who oppose political correctness must realize that freedom of 
expression can no more be perfect in the university than in society. Legitimate 
limitations do exist.41 The university has a commitment to excellence but only 
limited funds. It must exercise judgment as to the value of various writings and 
projects. It is impossible to dissociate quality from content and to do so would be 
to turn moral and academic relativism into the type of established dogma one 
wants to avoid. A few simple illustrations show how opinions necessarily affect 
careers.
It would be entirely implausible for a department of geography to grant tenure 
to a member of the Flat Earth Society. Similarly, it would be difficult to imagine 
how Lysenko genetics could pass peer review.42 A history department could turn 
down a holocaust denier simply because refusing to recognize well-documented 
facts is not consistent with the methodology of historical research. However that 
does not justify proceedings of a purely punitive nature, either criminal or 
disciplinary. Nor does it justify imposing an ideology where the issues are 
contentious, but not totally clear.43
Whereas removing Mr. Keegstra from the class-room was an unimpeachably 
correct decision, prosecuting him criminally was dangerous, turning him into a 
potential martyr of the right and giving him importance he would not otherwise
^In Le Monde Diplomatique (January 1995), the front-page article of Ignacio Ramonet explores this 
phenomenon. It is quite clear that a modem economist who takes an interventionist, welfare state 
position puts himself or herself at risk of unemployment.
fe k e te , Moral Panic: Biopolitics Rising (Montreal: Robert Davies Publishing, 1994). This book 
provides an excellent bibliography. Ironically, Professor Fekete, as a student, was put before a McGill 
disciplinary tribunal for writing an allegedly indecent, “leftist” article. See Fekete v. Royal Institution 
for the Advancement of Learning, [1965] B.R. 1.
41For an obvious example, see Canadian Newspapers, supra note 16.
4*There was a case of Lysenko adepts at McGill in the 1970s. Lysenko was a pseudo-scientist whose 
theory that acquired characteristics could be inherited was imposed as dogma by Joseph Stalin
43Examples abound: Marxists vs. Anti-Marxists in economics and politics; false memory syndrome 
in psychology; and assimilation vs. multi-culturalism.
have had.44 The Ross45 case differs from Keegstra because Mr. Ross appears to 
refrain from anti-semitism in the class-room46 and therefore it appears to be 
more difficult to justify his dismissal.
Another consideration militates against repression. A study of the various 
cases shows that it is often the crank, and certainly the weak dissenter, who is 
subjected to pressure. In the 1950s, there was not a serious lobby supporting 
communists or Quebec’s Jehovah’s Witnesses. Today men like Keegstra and Ross 
are basically lone, verbal snipers against a powerful lobby.47 When well-placed 
individuals express views that could be seen as unacceptable, they are rarely caught 
by repressive laws.48
Further, repression is singularly ineffectual.49 It did not stamp out 
communism, Jehovah’s Witnesses, anti-Semitism or any other temporarily or 
permanently unpalatable “ism” that was singled out for attention. The country 
that most assiduously tried to outlaw ethnic hate and its expression was Tito’s 
Yugoslavia. Do its efforts appear successful today?
It follows that those dedicated to freedom of thought should reconcile 
themselves to the fact that occasional expression of distasteful views — racist, sexist, 
mendacious, scandalous -  must be tolerated. This is particularly wise for those 
who view themselves as being left of centre because they ultimately do not have 
the power in our society and so precedents of restrictions will usually be turned 
against them. There are limits to freedom of expression, but as Cory J.50 and 
Baudouin J A .51 pointed out, these must be applied only to the extremely narrow 
category of statements whose harm can be demonstrated. Whenever the use of
44This author says this despite the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the law.
asR o s s  v. N.B. (Human Rights Board of Inquiry) (1991), 110 N.B.R. (2d) 107 (CA.).
^One may question the reason for letting him work outside the class-room only. What is the 
rationale?
47Nothing should be read as approval of them or an attempt to liken them to communists or Jehovah’s 
Witnesses.
^Has Jean-Marie Le Pen been prosecuted on any fundamental question? Or Ian Paisley? Or Hitler, 
once he had sufficient electoral support?
49Yet in Dagenais, supra note 7, Lamer CJ.C. insisted that effectiveness is also an important issue.
If a ban is ineffectual it should not be imposed even if it otherwise met the strict requirements.
^See Edmonton Journal, supra note 37.
restrictive measures seems worthy of debate, one should exercise discretion in 
favour of freedom.52
52The calls for freedom, like the calls for restriction have come from both right and left. On the 
relative right, the late Professor Allan Bloom discussed this issue in several books, including his last 
one Love and Friendship (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). In what is clearly a more liberal 
milieu, we can read Professor Fekete, supra note 40; K. Selick “Censorship -  More Demeaning than 
Pornography” Lawyer Magazine (May 1993); Dworkin, “Women and Pornography” New York Review 
of Books (21 October 1993). As Michael Coren wrote in “Men” The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (14 
July 1993), “puritanism is the handmaiden of political extremism both left and right”. It follows that 
tolerance of opposing views is the hallmark of both the democratic left and the democratic right.
